One of them was Nedim Şener, a meticulous özenli reporter I barely ancak know yet genuinely gerçekten respect, for his exposure teşhir of the "deep state" in the infamous rezil Hrant Dink murder case. Another was Ahmet Şık, who is also known for his brave journalism on the criminals within Turkish security forces
"This is unbelievable," said a friend of mine, who is a dedicated adanmış human rights lawyer, on the phone. "This Ergenekon thing has gone out of control."
Facts and excesses ölçüsüzlük
In fact, that was my sense anlam for a while. Unlike most Kemalists, I do not think that the Ergenekon case, the most controversial trial of recent Turkish history, is a political operation "to crack down sert önlemler almak on Patriot vatansever kişi." Unlike foreign journalists such Gareth Jenkins, I also do not think that "fantasy" is what really lies behind much of the case. I rather tercihen believe that most suspects şüpheli involved in the Ergenekon trial were really craving can atmak and scheming tasarlamak for a military coup askeri darbe against the elected government. But that does not blind me from the excesses of the investigation, which seem to have skyrocketed birden artmak this week.
Let me elaborate açıklamak a bit. Those who are not yet initiated öğretmek to Turkey might find it bizarre tuhaf that any journalist can ever be a suspect for a military coup scheme. But history suggests öne sürmek otherwise başka türlü. The two military coups that targeted hedef almak a particular belli political line, those of May 27, 1960, and Feb. 28, 1997, were carried out with the active support of the media. Both of these coups overthrew hükümeti devirme governments that were found too pro-Islamic, or not Kemalist enough, and the Kemalist-minded media supported them rigorously kesin olarak through black propaganda. Especially in the latter sonraki case, the "post-modern coup" of 1997, the generals and their media yes-men worked in perfect harmony, with false stories created in the barracks kışla and promoted in the headlines.
When the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, came to power in late 2002, the same coalition felt uneasy once again. As the AKP proved to be resilient esnek to the military's dictates prensip; emir, and dared to disobey the generals who saw themselves as the ultimate esas owners of the state, the Kemalist anger grew. So, "meetings" began between generals, and some of their civilian friends, which included journalists, on how to overthrow the AKP. We know this clearly from the electronic diaries and phone conversations of the Ergenekon suspects, which the police were closely monitoring.
According to the Ergenekon prosecutors, this coalition even planned some killings and bombings, such as the shoot out at the Council of State and the bombing of daily Cumhuriyet, to hit these secular targets and then put the blame on the "Islamists."
The two iconic journalists who have been Ergenekon suspects since 2008, Mustafa Balbay and Tuncay Özkan, are on trial for not what they have written, but because they were conspiring gizlice anlaşmak with the coup-craving generals. That's why I never saw their trial as an attack on press freedom. (I just object to the fact that they are on trial under custody tutukluluk– a terrible Turkish legal tradition to that I object to in general.)
Yet as the Ergenekon probe soruşturma extended, I began to see a risk: Some people seemed to have become suspects merely sadece for being passionately tutkulu bir şekilde anti-AKP and having "connections" with more established suspects – connections that could have been just normal contacts and friendships. That's why I have insisted on making a crucial çok önemli distinction ayrım: between people who merely have a radical Kemalist ideology, and those who have decided to commit crimes (such as planning a coup) for the sake of that ideology.
When Soner Yalçın and his colleagues were arrested two weeks ago, I re-emphasized that distinction, remaining skeptical şüpheci about the charges. But in this recent case, that of Nedim Şener et al.ve diğerleri, even the ideological element is not there! And the "evidence"proposed ileri sürmek, that files written about or by them are found in Soner Yalçın's computer, is all too unconvincing inandırıcı olmayan.
Turkish McCarthyism?
Hence bundan dolayı, I agree with the critics who see a risk of "McCarthyism" here – with the important difference being that while the Red Peril of Senator McCarthy was totally delusional hezeyanlı, the Ergenekon threat is real. But exaggerating the threat and over-extending the probe is all too dangerous. It risks not only harming innocent people, but also unintentionally whitewashing temize çıkma the real criminals.
Finally, the pro-AKP conservatives who have passionately supported the Ergenekon case must be careful to be principled prensipli. Their fear of a Kemalist backlash geri tepme is most understandable, but they would become like their enemy if they begin to believe that the end justify haklı çıkarmak the means araç.
Let's make no mistake: the "new Turkey" these conservatives are proud to build must be a country in which everybody, including the Kemalists, is free – and free from fear. Otherwise, there will only be new winners and new losers, instead of the old ones. And the "new Turkish model," so popular in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere, will fade all too quickly.